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Innovation Priorities for UK Bioenergy:
Technological Expectations within Path 
Dependence 
Les Levidow, Theo Papaioannou and Alexander Borda-Rodriguez
UK bioenergy innovation pathways have been locked into current energy 
infrastructure through technological expectations, especially the reciprocal 
requirements of state bodies and industry. Over the past decade UK policy has given 
bioenergy an increasingly important role for decarbonising the energy system; 
technoscientifi c innovation has been expected to expand the range of biomass 
that can be sustainably converted to energy. Needing industry investment to fulfi l 
its policy aims, the UK government has faced requirements to provide long-term 
support measures. Innovation priorities have been shaped by policy arrangements 
closely involving industry with state bodies. Their expectations for future benefi ts 
have mobilised resources for bioenergy innovation mainly as input-substitutes 
within current energy infrastructural patterns; novel path creation lies within a path 
dependence. Although technical progress has encountered diffi  culties and long 
delays, expectations for economic and environmental benefi ts have built support, 
while confl ating national benefi ts with private-sector interests. Through such 
expectations, innovation priorities wishfully enact some desired futures from among 
those which had been advocated in policy documents. 
Keywords: Technological expectations, path dependence, energy infrastructure
Introduction
Over the past decade, United Kingdom 
(UK) policy has given renewable energy an 
increasingly important role. Environmental 
aims include: reducing greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions, moving to a low-carbon 
economy and better managing waste 
(DECC, 2009a, 2009b; HMG, 2010). Th rough 
these measures, Britain must ‘make the 
necessary transition to low carbon – right 
for climate change, energy security and 
jobs’ (DECC, 2009b: v). 
Th is transition is stimulated by mandato-
ry targets. Under the Renewable Energy Di-
rective (EC, 2009), EU member states must 
obtain 10% of their transport fuel from re-
newable sources; biofuels have been expect-
ed to provide most. Th e UK must also obtain 
15% of all its energy from renewable sources 
by 2020; it seeks to fulfi ll at least half that tar-
get through bioenergy – a great expansion 
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from only 2% in 2011 (HMG, 2011b: 3, cit-
ing AEA, 2010). Th e UK has more ambitious 
longer-term targets: the Climate Change Act 
2008 mandates GHG reductions of at least 
34% by 2020 and 80% by 2050. 
Renewable energy encompasses diverse 
environmental sources such as solar, 
wind and wave. By contrast, bioenergy 
depends on traditional processes for 
converting biomass, especially from 
food and wood sources which have been 
criticised as environmentally unsustainable 
(Biofuelwatch, 2012). To increase bioenergy 
production, excessive increases in biomass 
imports ‘could have counterproductive 
sustainability impacts in the absence of 
compensating technology developments 
or identifi cation of additional resources’, 
according to an expert study (Th ornley et al., 
2009: 5623). To compensate for (or avoid) 
those sustainability problems, technology 
innovators have sought to expand the 
range of non-food biomass that can be 
converted to energy. Multiple innovation 
pathways have competed for public-sector 
funds, while also anticipating that biomass 
sources may become more expensive and/
or controversial. 
Th e UK government likewise emphasises 
the need for technoscientifi c innovation to 
ensure expansion of ‘sustainable bioenergy’ 
for its policy aims (e.g. HMG, 2011a: 70). 
Mutual requirements arise: the state 
needs industry R&D investment, which 
in turn needs state incentives and long-
term commitments, which in turn need 
explicit justifi cations in future benefi ts. 
Th ese reciprocal dynamics involve several 
state bodies, including non-departmental 
organisations and funding sources as well 
as Ministries.  
Th is paper provides an empirically-
based  understanding of  how bioenergy 
innovation priorities are shaped by 
technological expectations, especially the 
reciprocal requirements of state bodies 
and industry. Th e main question to be 
discussed is: How do expectations for future 
technology mobilise resources for some 
innovation trajectories rather than others? 
Th is question is accompanied by subsidiary 
questions about UK state bodies: How do 
they promote benefi cent expectations for 
future technoscientifi c advance as means 
to fulfi l policy goals, especially a low-carbon 
future? How do they establish incentives 
for industry investment in bioenergy 
innovation? How they favour some 
innovation pathways rather than others? 
Th ose questions will be answered 
by linking two analytical concepts – 
technological expectations and path 
dependence. Previous case studies on 
technological expectations have analysed 
promise-requirement cycles, especially 
how promises turn into requirements 
for innovators. Our case study highlights 
requirements on state bodies and thus 
reciprocal dynamics with industry. 
Th e paper is structured as follows: 
Th e fi rst section discusses the two 
analytical concepts – technological 
expectations and path dependence – as 
a basis to deepen the above questions. 
Th e second section presents the research 
methods. Th e third explains how the UK’s 
technological expectations for bioenergy 
innovation turn into state requirements 
for industry incentives, how these are 
offi  cially justifi ed within the overall ‘low-
carbon’ policy, and how new institutional 
arrangements structure state-industry 
reciprocal dynamics. Further illustrating 
those dynamics, the fourth section shows 
how UK bioenergy innovation priorities 
complement high-carbon infrastructural 
patterns, thus extending a path dependence. 
Th e fi nal section summarises answers to the 
main questions on innovation priorities. 
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Analytical Perspectives
As mentioned above, this paper links two 
analytical frameworks – technological 
expectations and path dependence – as dual 
aspects of bioenergy policy. Th e former can 
help to identify actors’ diff erent accounts of 
future benefi ts, especially as strategies to 
mobilise resources for specifi c pathways; 
the latter can illuminate lock-in from past 
infrastructure. 
Technological expectations have been 
theorised as ‘real-time representations 
of future technological situations and 
capabilities’ (Borup et al., 2006: 288). 
Rather than simply predict future realities, 
expectations guide technological and 
economic activities, provide legitimation 
and structure to them, and so ultimately 
direct investment towards specifi c 
innovation pathways. Th ey not only defi ne 
roles and duties but also prepare actors for 
opportunities and risks. . 
Expectations play a central role in 
mobilizing resources, ‘for example in 
national policy through regulation and 
research patronage’ (Borup et al., 2006: 
286). Technological expectations can help 
to convince funders and other practitioners 
to support a development (Geels & Smit, 
2000: 882; van Lente, 1993: 185). Related 
terms such as technological ‘promises’ 
and ‘visions’ emphasize their enacting, 
performative character: ‘expectations are 
wishful enactments of a desired future’ 
(Borup et al., 2006: 286), i.e. actions meant 
to realise such a future. 
Technology innovators may exaggerate 
their promises for several aims – in order 
to attract attention from fi nancial sponsors, 
to stimulate agenda-setting processes 
(both technical and political) and to 
build ‘protected spaces’, e.g. protecting an 
innovation from market competition (Geels 
& Smit, 2000: 882). Given the pressure on 
innovators to exaggerate expectations, ‘the 
frequent disappointments to which they 
lead are accompanied by serious costs in 
terms of reputations, misallocated resources 
and investment’ (Borup et al., 2006: 290). 
Technological expectations can turn into 
requirements for the actors who formulate 
them. Promises may attract resources and 
protection but also return as obligations 
through ‘promise-requirement cycles’. A 
techno-optimistic claim or a promise may 
become a required action – e.g. a technical 
specifi cation to be fulfi lled and/or political 
support to be provided (van Lente 2000; 
van Lente & Rip, 1998). State support may 
become a greater requirement in contexts 
where policy goals depend on the fulfi lment 
of technological expectations; such a 
requirement, which has received little 
attention in the academic literature, will be 
the focus here. 
While envisaging great change, 
technological expectations may 
complement current patterns. Industrial 
interests may seek ‘large-scale investment 
in improvement options that only fi t into 
the existing system and which, as a result, 
stimulate a “lock-in” situation’ (Kemp & 
Rotmans, 2005: 49). Lock-in can result 
from path dependence, whereby previous 
trajectories constrain later ones, though 
this is conceptualised in diff erent ways. 
According to some frameworks, self-
reinforcing mechanisms prevail over actors 
– unless an exogenous shock gives them 
new opportunities. According to another 
framework, actors can gain collective 
agency as an emergent attribute of their 
interactions. Th rough alternative visions 
of the future, they can mobilise resources 
towards path creation (Garud et al., 2010: 
768). 
Energy systems have been analysed 
as path dependence and creation. In the 
20th century they were largely locked-in 
to hydrocarbon sources (Unruh, 2000). 
‘Energy systems, not just individual 
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technologies, are largely characterized by 
path dependence’ (Lovio et al., 2011: 277). 
Given the problems of hydrocarbon fuels, 
however, ‘the path dependence forces of the 
old, dominant fossil-fuel technologies are 
turning into forces of destabilization’, thus 
opening up path creation (Lovio et al., 2011: 
283). A key driver for energy innovation has 
been environmental policy, which in turn 
responds to public demands. Yet energy 
users cannot easily compare environmental 
eff ects of various sources invisibly supplying 
a central grid (Lovio et al., 2011: 283).
Th e search for secure, low-carbon energy 
can highlight societal choices and open up 
extra ones. Renewable energy has often been 
designed according to the ‘bigger is better’ 
view, assuming that this will be cheaper per 
unit energy production and GHG-reduction. 
By the 1990s this assumption was being 
contradicted by some renewable electricity 
technologies such as solar and wind. Th ey 
were lowering their costs faster than large-
scale systems, especially through modular 
systems (Diesendorf, 1996; Neij, 1997). In 
some forms, renewable energy has better 
compatibility with decentralised, distributed 
energy generation (Rohracher, 2008: 145-
146). In response to social movements, 
energy decentralisation has been linked 
with renewable energy sources by some 
governments, especially in Scandinavia (van 
der Vleuten & Raven, 2006).  UK bioenergy 
innovation encompasses diverse potential 
ways to link technoscientifi c advance with 
societal visions, e.g. dominant centralised 
infrastructure or decentralisation (Levidow 
et al., 2013). 
When creating new pathways, however, 
large incumbent fi rms tend to accommodate 
pressures for GHG savings in ways 
protecting their previous investment. Th ese 
are ‘large sunk costs in roads and supporting 
infrastructures and even larger costs in the 
community structure’; alternatives would 
require huge fi xed costs (Lovio et al., 2011: 
292). Consequently: 
Incumbent technologies enjoy huge 
advantages including pre-established 
infrastructure, relative ease in obtain-
ing fi nance and insurance, developed 
networks of suppliers, familiarity to 
customers, embedded technical stand-
ards and training routines, and a tight 
‘fi t’ with existing regulatory approaches 
(Meadowcroft, 2009: 329). 
For better recouping investment, then, it 
pays to hit the market fi rst – in other words, 
‘to build a low-carbon lock-in’ (Lovio et 
al., 2011: 280). Th us a new lock-in may 
happen by design through the collective 
agency of dominant actors protecting past 
infrastructural investment. 
Alongside sunk costs are sunk practices, 
invisibly structured by infrastructure. Th is 
is more profound than an external context: 
‘Infrastructure is sunk into and inside of 
other structures, social arrangements and 
technologies’ (Star, 1999: 381). Together 
they ‘structure nature as resource, fuel or 
“raw material” which must be shaped and 
processed by technological means to satisfy 
human ends’ (Edwards, 2003: 189). In this 
regard, the term ‘energy’ often confl ates 
specifi c fuel sources with entire systems, 
whose security and effi  ciency depend 
on infrastructural choices. By contrast to 
dominant infrastructures, for example, 
micro-generation encourages a systems 
approach to optimize entire local systems 
(Patterson, 2006).
Flexibility has been attributed to 
technologies per se, yet their design limits 
fl exibility through wider infrastructural 
choices. When devising ways out of a high-
carbon lock-in, e.g. through Carbon Capture 
and Storage (CCS), the main issue is 
fl exibility of the overall energy system vis à vis 
path dependence and creation (Markusson, 
Les Levidow, Theo Papaioannou and Alexander Borda-Rodriguez
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2012: 392). Biomass-fuelled CCS has been 
widely expected to provide carbon-negative 
emissions, but such benefi ts depend upon 
numerous optimistic assumptions – about 
biomass production, biomass combustion, 
carbon capture, etc. (Smolker & Ernsting, 
2012). Bionergy CCS has been promoted 
as a fl exible technology, adaptable to 
various contexts and aims, yet it readily 
complements present infrastructure. As 
‘fruits of technical fi xes’, CCS can contribute 
to policy aims for GHG savings in the short 
term, while avoiding the need for systemic 
innovation (Kemp and Rotmans, 2005: 48). 
CCS reinforces infrastructural dependence 
on fossil fuels: ‘It is mainly applied to make 
coal-fi red power plants more acceptable 
and thus acts as an instrument for reinforced 
fossil fuel lock-in’ (Vergragt et al., 2011: 290). 
Although bioenergy-CCS is meant to off er 
greater GHG savings, in practice
Adding CCS does not substantially 
change the interrelatedness of the fos-
sil fuel regime. It remains tightly linked 
with the centralized grid for power dis-
tribution and it thus weakens the viabil-
ity of distributed energy sources, which 
are favoured by many renewable energy 
options (Vergragt et al., 2011: 284).
As extra impetus for path dependence, 
since the 1990s EU-wide policies have been 
liberalising the energy supply. Such changes 
have weakened government ownership or 
control over the sector (Faij, 2006). As an 
extreme case, the UK electricity system was 
bought up by foreign-owned multinational 
companies (Meek, 2012). Consequently, the 
newly privatised industries favoured less 
capital-intensive improvements because 
they were forced to recoup investment over 
shorter time periods than their nationalised 
predecessors (Shackley & Green, 2007). 
Energy innovation depends upon 
co-fi nancing by large-scale industry, 
whose investment has been largely path-
dependent, especially in the UK. For 
example, since the 1980s the UK government 
has advocated combined heat & power 
(CHP) for more effi  ciently using fuel, but 
this pathway attracted little investment by 
either public or private sectors (Russell, 
1993). Energy-sector liberalisation was 
expected to expand opportunities for more 
diverse systems, yet the new electricity 
market created more obstacles for CHP. 
Consequently, the scant adoption has come 
mainly from some large industrial plants 
for their own use (Russell, 2010). Domestic 
micro-CHP has gained modest adoption 
but will remain a small niche market 
without coordinated support measures 
(Hudson et al., 2011). CHP depends on 
new infrastructural investment for district 
heating, especially from local authorities, 
but their capacities have been undermined 
by governmental centralisation since the 
1990s and even further by budget constraints 
since 2010. 
Decentralisation options such as renew-
able-energy micro-generation high light de-
sign choices for linking infrastructure with 
users’ knowledge. Renewable energy can 
provide simply an input-substitute for a con-
ventional system which separates personal 
behaviour from energy consumption; such 
design illustrates a socio-technical ‘lock-
in’. Alternatively, micro-generation can be 
designed for a cultural-behavioural shift 
towards users’ control and responsibility, 
linked with knowledge of renewable energy 
sources; this linkage off ers greater oppor-
tunities to reduce energy usage and GHG 
emissions. Relevant technologies include 
biomass-fuelled boilers and micro-CHP 
(Bergman  & Eyre, 2011; also POST, 2012). 
To go beyond the dominant infrastructure, 
decentralisation ‘implies breaking up the 
large energy companies and reducing de-
pendence on the national grid for electric-
ity supplies’, especially through popular 
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engagement building an alternative power 
base (Scrase & Smith, 2009: 723). 
Research Methods
Th is paper arises from a study focusing on 
technological expectations of numerous 
state bodies, as briefl y described here. A 
decade ago bioenergy was being promoted 
mainly by two government bodies – the 
Dept of Trade & Industry (DTI) and Dept 
of the Environment, Farming and Rural 
Aff airs (DEFRA). In 2009 bioenergy policy 
was transferred to the new Department of 
Energy and Climate Change (DECC), which 
acquired some former staff  of both the 
other ministries. Meanwhile the DTI was 
renamed the Dept for Business and Industry 
(BIS). Th e Dept for Transport (DfT) sets 
mandatory quotas for biofuels. 
Public-sector funds for novel bioenergy 
technology have several sources. ‘Strategic 
research’ has been funded mainly through 
Research Councils – in particular, the 
Biotechnology and Biological Sciences 
Research Council (BBSRC), and the 
Engineering and Physical Sciences Research 
Council (EPSRC). Th e latter has co-funded 
the Energy Technologies Institute (ETI), self-
described as ‘a UK-based private company 
formed from global industries and the UK 
Government’. Near-market innovation has 
been funded mainly through government 
departments, e.g. via specifi c project grants 
or subsidy for renewable energy.
Th e study underpinning this paper 
used two main methods of data gathering: 
documents and interviews. Together 
these methods identifi ed technological 
expectations within policy processes, as 
follows. 
Documents: the study analysed more 
than thirty documents from several bodies 
– especially government departments, 
Research Councils, research institutes, 
Parliamentary hearings, industry and 
NGOs. As listed in the References section, 
sources include: government departments 
(e.g. DEFRA, DTI, DECC), expert reports that 
they have cited and generally funded (e.g. 
AEA, NNFCC, E4tech, ERP, LCICG), research 
councils (e.g. BBSRC/BSBEC, EPSRC 
with ETI), other state bodies (EAC, RFA, 
CCC, etc.) whose views elicit government 
responses, and industry organisations (e.g., 
REA). Analysis focused on expectations 
for economic benefi ts and environmental 
sustainability, as dual rationales to mobilise 
investment in specifi c innovation pathways. 
Initial results led to a more systematic search 
of documents over the past decade, in order 
to identify discursive patterns – among 
relevant bodies and over time. 
Interviews: Th e document analysis 
provided a stronger basis for interview 
questions, which investigated in depth 
the process of selecting priorities for 
bioenergy R&D. Face-to-face interviews 
have been carried out with 20 individuals 
from the same bodies which originated the 
policy documents (listed above and in the 
References section). 
Th e project held two seminars (on 
13.10.11 and 20.11.12), presenting prelimi-
nary results to key actors and gathering 
complementary data. Discussions there also 
provided confi rmatory comments and extra 




Th e UK state and industry have promoted 
technological expectations that bioenergy 
innovation will help to fulfi l targets for GHG 
savings, among other societal benefi ts. 
Th ese promises have been turned into 
requirements for industry to demonstrate 
technical progress, as well as for state 
bodies to make long-term commitments for 
support measures, especially as incentives 
for industry investment. Within those 
Les Levidow, Theo Papaioannou and Alexander Borda-Rodriguez
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reciprocal dynamics, tensions have arisen 
among diff erent policy aims, energy futures, 
innovation pathways, their uncertain 
feasibility and expected benefi ts. Th ose 
tensions have been contained through 
technological expectations for bioenergy 
innovation in general, while ostensibly 
keeping open future options for state 
support and commercial development. 
Tensions among policy aims 
For many years, UK bioenergy policy 
has implied that technological pathways 
are constrained or even chosen by 
external forces, thereby leaving priorities 
ambiguous. Although various measures 
are meant to ‘deliver’ government targets, 
policy language attributes responsibility 
to external forces such as innovation, 
technologies, commercial development 
and/or the market (e.g. DECC, 2009a: 
53; DECC, 2011: 43; DEFRA, 2007a: 35; 
HMG, 2011a: 5). Along similar lines, ‘Th e 
government does not pick winners; industry 
is better at it’, say senior civil servants 
(DECC participant, bioenergy workshop, 
13.10.11; also interview, DECC, 14.08.12). 
Industry likewise requests incentives which 
do ‘not pick winners’, e.g. for the biofuels 
sector (submissions in EAC, 2008b). For 
developing specifi c technologies, however, 
private-sector investors request a long-
term, stable policy commitment.  
Th at request has been somewhat 
accommodated. According to the 2012 UK 
Bioenergy Strategy, support measures should 
follow four general principles – e.g. to make 
a cost-eff ective contribution to UK carbon 
emission objectives, to target bioenergy 
at uses which will have no alternative low-
carbon source, and to maximise the overall 
benefi ts and minimise costs (quantifi able 
and non-quantifi able) across the economy. 
It must use ‘sustainably-sourced biomass’ 
to ensure a contribution to GHG savings. 
Flexible innovation trajectories should 
accommodate uncertainties about 
environmentally sustainable biomass 
supplies and future technological 
development (DECC et al., 2012a: 6-7). 
In relation to those principles, the strategy 
document elaborates the concept ‘risk’. Th is 
is given several meanings: expected benefi ts 
may not materialise; some bioenergy 
pathways may not be truly renewable, 
low carbon, environmentally sustainable, 
cost-eff ective for GHG reductions, etc. 
(DECC et al., 2012a: 6). ‘Low risk’ means 
that a gradual, step-wise development can 
indicate future feasibility at modest cost 
(interview, DECC, 14.08.12). As a related 
risk, a long-term commitment may lock out 
future alternatives later seen as preferable 
(DECC et al., 2012a: 57). A pathway may 
become locked in, e.g. through investment 
decisions and several thousand jobs, so that 
government may face political diffi  culties 
in shifting its support to a diff erent pathway 
later; such lock-in may already be happening 
with conventional biofuels (interview, 
DEFRA, 22.05.12). 
Based on those criteria, the strategy 
document identifi es medium-term ‘low-
risk bioenergy pathways’. Th ese include 
the following: some conventional biofuels; 
CHP processes effi  ciently utilising 
recoverable wastes; sustainable biomass 
for decarbonising power generation which 
currently uses coal as a feedstock (DECC et 
al., 2012a: 40; also 8-9). Th e latter justifi es 
subsidy for co-fi ring biomass in coal-fi red 
electricity plants, on the assumption that 
they will be phased out anyway by the late 
2020s – rather than support new dedicated 
biomass plants (DECC et al., 2012a: 45). 
Yet either pathway reinforces electricity-
only generation, while losing links to CHP 
which could use the waste heat. Moreover, 
biomass input-substitution can lower SO2 
emissions below more stringent future limits 
for coal plants, thus helping to extend the 
lifespan of this high-carbon energy source 
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(Sloss, 2010). Th us the policy subsidises a 
cheap way to increase ‘renewable energy’ 
per se, rather than prioritise GHG savings. 
‘Although we look at 2050, the main focus 
is getting to the 2020 targets cost eff ectively’ 
(interview, DECC, 14.08.12).
Biomass co-fi ring exemplifi es a general 
pattern: biomass input-substitution 
has favoured large-scale supply chains, 
centralisation and agri-industrial biomass 
supply for whatever processes can 
maximise renewable energy by the 2020 
target. Towards its fulfi lment, some R&D 
attempts to overcome problems of current 
technology ‘We send researchers to existing 
plants where certain technologies are not 
working, to fi nd out why – before thinking 
about how to redesign the world’ (interview, 
Supergen Bioenergy programme, 18.09.12). 
Alongside environmental aims, bioenergy 
policy also seeks national economic benefi t 
of two main kinds – lowering national costs 
of GHG savings, and creating or capturing 
economic wealth. Th e latter can mean 
profi t, jobs, licence patents, royalties, etc. – 
according to the Technology Strategy Board, 
which is governed mainly by industry 
representatives (interview, TSB, 15.06.12). 
Such benefi ts can be achieved in various 
ways, e.g. via technology-licensing revenue 
through a plant being built somewhere else 
in the world, or revenue from constructing a 
plant in the UK, according to a government 
consultant (interview, E4tech, 19.06.12). By 
targeting strong areas of national expertise, 
‘the UK could potentially capture 5-10% 
of the global market within select niches 
of bioenergy’, e.g. by exporting intellectual 
property for new energy crops and advanced 
biofuels, according to a state-industry expert 
group (LCICG, 2012: 5-6). Such expectations 
for future economic benefi t have infl uenced 
priorities for bioenergy innovation. 
Bioenergy innovation as input-substitute
Corresponding to the above technological 
expectations, UK strategy envisages 
bioenergy mainly as an input-substitute 
within current large-scale centralised 
infrastructures for producing, delivering 
and using energy. Bioenergy resources 
are promoted for their fl exibility, cost 
and ‘suitability to existing infrastructure’ 
(LCICG, 2012: 9). According to a policy 
assumption, economy of scale generally 
helps to optimise cost-eff ective GHG savings 
through bioenergy. Moreover, this avoids 
potential problems. As one policymaker 
stated: ‘You just feed the energy into the 
power grid and there’s no issue with the end 
user’ (interview, DECC, 14.08.12). 
Such policy assumptions coincide with 
priorities of multinational companies 
dominating the energy industry. Input-
substitution likewise has been promoted by 
the Renewable Energy Association (REA), 
representing various energy trajectories. 
It advocates a key role for power stations 
using biomass from feedstock produced 
sustainably, as well as for road transport to 
use biofuels, which ‘need to peak in 2030 
and remain a signifi cant element until 2045’ 
(REA, 2011a). Pyrolysis oils can substitute for 
diesel, likewise biomass for oil in producing 
plastics, likewise digestate for chemical 
fertiliser, etc. (REA, 2011b). To incentivise 
substitution of fossil fuels, the REA lobbies 
for supportive government policies – R&D 
funds as well as operational subsidies. 
From the standpoint of technology 
investors, high or uncertain costs may 
be incurred before clarifying technical 
feasibility, thus needing a long-term 
commitment to explore the potential. 
For Research Council grants, a de-risking 
strategy gives industry a signifi cant infl uence 
at low cost. According to a bioenergy 
research manager of a research council: 
Les Levidow, Theo Papaioannou and Alexander Borda-Rodriguez
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We take a lot of risk out of the early fun-
damental research that most industry 
does not want to do…. We de-risk their 
fundamental research. And if they’d 
like to give us some guidance as to 
where that research could go, there are 
various ways. For instance, if they take 
a 10% stake in a project, then a proposal 
will automatically get lifted up the pri-
ority scale (BBSRC interview, 05.04.11).
Scientists’ R&D proposals advocate specifi c 
technological pathways as means to fulfi l 
various policy aims and to anticipate 
economic gains attracting private-sector 
sponsors. Th eir fi nancial contribution has 
been an advantage or even a condition 
for a grant proposal to gain a Research 
Council grant. Co-funding has come from 
international companies in the biotech, 
enzyme, sugar and energy sectors (Eggar, 
2012). Such industrial interests frame 
priorities for technoscientifi c expertise and 
advance. According to a research manager: 
If you don’t provide technologies that 
industry will adopt, then it’s pointless 
having done the R&D to develop them… 
Th e future expectation for a technology 
has to sit within an existing landscape. 
You have to be able to make your new 
technology fi t in (interview, Supergen, 
18.09.12). 
As related expectations, industry co-funding 
requires the public sector to maintain 
commercial confi dentiality, even within 
the same institute, especially to protect 
intellectual property. Th ese arrangements 
favour research agendas expecting 
proprietary knowledge, e.g. via company 
secrecy or patents (interview, BSBEC, 
04.08.11). Th is eff ort is meant to make 
UK science and industry more globally 
competitive. In practice, however, UK 
public-sector researchers compete against 
each other to obtain industry fi nance from 
potentially anywhere in the world.
A key aim is to overcome the ‘valley of 
death’ which has generally kept UK research 
distant from commercial application, 
especially in bioenergy (LCICG, 2012: 27). To 
overcome this obstacle in near-commercial 
scale-up, the Energy Technologies Institute 
brings together several companies which 
thereby share the high costs and fi nancial 
risks. ETI de-risks technology by identifying 
long-term technological needs. Set up as 
a club, ETI pools company funds in order 
to reduce fi nancial exposure of any one 
company, while providing half of the overall 
funds from goverment (interview, ETI, 
08.06.12). Priorities are implicitly steered 
through co-funding between public and 
private sectors, in parallel with consultation 
processes, e.g. through the Technology 
Strategy Board. 
Innovation priorities anticipate 
bioenergy input-substitutes as invisible, 
so that GHG savings will not depend 
on consumer knowledge or behaviour. 
‘Bioenergy sources will not be noticed by 
energy consumers’, thus avoiding potential 
problems: ‘People in the UK don’t want to 
buy heat from CHP; they hate such projects 
locally’ (DECC participant in our workshop, 
13.10.11). If householders are invited to 
install biomass boilers, for example, then 
GHG savings depend on behavioural 
change; such responsibility may elicit 
complaints or recalcitrance. Moreover, if 
consumers know that a proportion of their 
grid-energy comes from renewable energy, 
then some feel entitled to increase GHG 
emissions in their travel behaviour. To 
avoid such problems, therefore, substituting 
renewable energy ideally ‘should not require 
active behavioural changes from people or 
trigger undesirable behavioural changes’ 
(interview, DECC, 14.08.12). 
As a diff erent future vision, UK policy 
and R&D strategy have also advocated 
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decentralisation through renewable energy, 
especially micro-generation, micro-
CHP, etc. Local renewable sources and 
visibility can help give more responsibility 
to consumers (e.g. DTI, 2007: 12; UKERC, 
2009: 3). For example, biowaste-CHP 
could help to decentralise production, 
while also enhancing use of waste-heat, 
thus saving GHG emissions (DECC, 2009a: 
115). But such pathways have gained little 
from government support measures; ‘lack 
of local heat networks’ is identifi ed as an 
obstacle – but not as a priority (LCICG, 
2012: 16). Th us a putatively desirable future 
remains marginal within industry co-
funding arrangements and their specifi c 
expectations for economic benefi ts. 
Path-dependent Innovation Priorities
Amongst many potential pathways, UK bio-
energy innovation priorities have generally 
complemented the past infrastructural in-
vestment in high-carbon production-con-
sumption patterns, thus reinforcing a path 
dependence. Despite technical diffi  culties 
and long delays in those innovation path-
ways, expectations for economic benefi ts 
have helped to mobilise resources, while 
confl ating national benefi ts with private-
sector interests.  Such expectations have 
been elaborated through state-industry in-
stitutional arrangements, as this section will 
show. 
As a long-standing feature of UK policy 
documents, Carbon Capture and Storage 
(CCS) has been under development mainly 
for gas and coal-fi red plants, with potential 
adaptation to bioenergy such as co-fi ring. As 
a strong policy imperative for biomass CCS, 
the 2050 targets for GHG savings would be 
otherwise much more costly to achieve. 
Th us ‘the availability of CCS is key in the 
longer term’ through linkages with other 
bioenergy technologies. But their costs 
and availability remain highly uncertain, 
‘especially for unproven technologies in 
later periods, e.g. biohydrogen for transport’ 
(DECC et al., 2012b: 8-9, 56). Given the 
uncertain feasibility of bioenergy-CCS 
itself, ‘the most appropriate energy use will 
vary according to the availability of carbon 
capture and storage’ (DECC et al., 2012a: 9). 
Th us expectations for bioenergy-CCS 
frame uncertainties about future bioenergy 
capacities and needs. As ‘the key bioenergy 
hedging options against these inherent 
long-term uncertainties’, the UK strategy 
identifi es three technologies – biosynthetic 
gas, hydrogen and advanced biofuels (DECC 
et al., 2012a: 38). Flexibility is attributed to 
such technologies per se: ‘Th e development 
of fl exible bioenergy technologies which 
can contribute to the decarbonisation 
of diff erent sectors is a way of mitigating 
against the inherent uncertainties’ (DECC et 
al., 2012a: 42). 
For the three ‘hedging options’ and 
CCS, sub-sections below analyse how each 
innovation pathway has been promoted 
through technological expectations, with 
varying support and relationships to the 
dominant energy infrastructure. Each 
section presents empirical material in 
roughly chronological order to analyse 
shifts in ‘real-time representations of future 
technological situations’ (Borup et al., 2006: 
288). 
Biohydrogen fuel cells
For at least the past decade, the UK 
government has advocated the redesign of 
vehicles for multiple fuel sources, towards 
‘building competitive advantage for the UK’s 
automotive industries as well as providing 
cleaner and better transport’ (DTI, 2003: 63). 
UK policy has envisaged decarbonisation of 
transport through electric cars, especially 
using hydrogen fuel cells (DfT, 2002, 
2009). Th ese have been foreseen as fl exible 
for storing various energy sources and 
supplying diverse energy uses. 
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According to a consultancy report for the 
DTI (E4tech et al., 2004: 227), UK regional 
capacities for hydrogen development 
could provide a competitive advantage in 
eff orts ‘to provide marketable products 
and services’ (E4tech et al., 2004: 91). As 
national economic benefi ts, moreover, 
‘Hydrogen has the potential to create 
innovation-led growth and employment, to 
attract inward investment, and to generate 
export opportunities both for hydrogen 
and for related technologies’ (E4tech et 
al., 2004: 144). In addition to saving GHG 
emissions, hydrogen fuel ‘could also help to 
improve air quality, through zero or very low 
emissions of pollutants… at the point of use’ 
(E4tech et al., 2004: 143). Th ose economic 
and environmental benefi ts could be 
enhanced through biomass gasifi cation to 
biohydrogen fuel (E4tech et al., 2004: 288).  
But a major obstacle would be the 
necessary infrastructural investment. 
As a transitional phase, hybrid petrol-
hydrogen vehicles could off er signifi cant 
GHG savings but ‘do not appear to be 
favoured by the auto and fuel industries as 
a result of infrastructure needs’ (E4tech et 
al., 2004: 64). As the report acknowledged, 
past investment in current petrol-vehicle 
infrastructure would be an obstacle. When 
economists reiterated a biohydrogen option, 
‘biomass gasifi cation to hydrogen’, they 
likewise mentioned possible diffi  culties in 
‘refuelling infrastructure’ for hydrogen fuel 
in general (Ekins and Hughes, 2010: 3). 
Echoing benefi ts in the E4tech report, 
biomass could be turned into synthetic 
liquid fuel, according to comments in a 
stakeholder workshop organised by the 
EPSRC’s UKSHEC programme. Th eir 
scenarios also linked biomass with small-
scale energy localisation: 
Hydrogen is produced both centrally 
and locally, using a variety of technolo-
gies, with a signifi cant proportion from 
distributed renewables (such as wind 
turbines and building-integrated PV) 
and biomass… (Eames & McDowall, 
2005: 9). 
Th e workshop outlined various scenarios 
where ‘futures are also distinguished by the 
degree of centralisation or decentralisation 
of the hydrogen generation and distribution 
infrastructure’ (Eames & McDowall, 2005: 
3). 
A hydrogen pathway has been often 
reiterated during the past decade. According 
to Th e UK Low Carbon Transition Plan, 
‘In the long term, reductions in emissions 
will require a radical transformation in 
the way vehicles are built and powered – 
whether hybrid, electric vehicles, biofuels 
or hydrogen fuel cell technology’ (DECC, 
2009b: 140). Government reports have 
anticipated ‘electric and plug-in hybrid 
cars becoming increasingly common’ from 
2012 onwards. ‘While electrically powered 
vehicles will increase demand for power, 
through smart management of our networks 
we can minimise the need for new power 
stations…’ (DfT-BERR, 2009: 3). 
Th e statutory Committee on Climate 
Change likewise envisaged a longer-term 
innovation pathway where transport is fully 
decarbonised by 2050, largely based on 
electric vehicles, i.e. battery and possibly 
hydrogen (CCC, 2011a: 151). Its Bioenergy 
Review recommended government action 
for ensuring alternatives to liquid fuels, 
especially for road transport, given the 
future prospect of greater competition 
for sustainable biomass (CCC, 2011b: 
11). In particular: ‘While the future use of 
hydrogen is uncertain, it potentially off ers 
an important route for decarbonising heavy-
duty vehicles (e.g. buses and heavy goods 
vehicles) where battery electric vehicles are 
unsuitable’ (CCC, 2011b: 62, 66). 
Biomass inputs would be even more 
desirable: ‘Hydrogen production. Th e 
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production of a zero-carbon energy carrier 
from biomass with CCS off ers negative 
emissions benefi ts similar to those for 
electricity generation’, further argued 
the Committee (CCC, 2011b: 62). To go 
beyond the internal combustion engine, 
transport fuel ‘could be biohydrogen if you 
made it from renewable electricity or if you 
generated it from waste’ (interview, CCC 
member, 17.11.11). As many stakeholders 
have argued, transport will need to be 
decarbonised ‘through a combination 
of biofuels and other renewable energy 
(such as hydrogen and electricity), vehicle 
effi  ciency and reducing the need to travel’ 
(respondents as summarised in DfT, 2011: 
64).  
Th e UK Bioenergy Strategy included 
hydrogen among three ‘hedging options’ 
for future uncertainties (DECC et al., 2012a: 
36, 41). It also emphasises diffi  culties for 
biohydrogen as a relatively more uncertain 
option regarding feasibility and cost: 
Th e most complex bioenergy pathway 
could involve one or more bioresources 
feeding into a conversion technology to 
produce a biomass carrier which is then 
used as an input to further conversion 
process to produce the fi nal product, 
e.g. the steps to produce biohydrogen…. 
Th e relative costs and availability of the 
technologies are subject to signifi cant 
uncertainty, especially for unproven 
technologies in later periods, e.g. bio-
hydrogen for transport (DECC et al., 
2012b: 49, 56).
Indeed, its commercialisation faces 
numerous technical obstacles – e.g. cleaning 
biogas for fuel cells, which themselves need 
advances in compression, lower ratios 
energy input-output, substitutes for rare 
earth-metals, etc. (HMG, 2011b: 53). 
Although other innovation pathways such 
as advanced biofuels also face technical 
obstacles, extra ones arise for hydrogen 
fuel cells. Several components of the supply 
chain need to be integrated – the focus of a 
recent initiative (TSB, 2012). Moreover, they 
need new dedicated infrastructure, thus 
potentially disrupting the incumbent one 
and incurring much greater capital costs. 
Partly for such reasons, this pathway has 
remained marginal within R&D priorities. 
Advanced biofuels 
Biofuel promoters have emphasised at 
least three future benefi ts, which serve 
as expectations for mobilising policy 
support for R&D funds. First, the oil and 
vehicle industries seek to recoup their past 
infrastructural investments; such interests 
are accommodated by R&D priorities for 
future biofuels. According to the Director 
of a Research Council, for example, 
‘Sustainable biofuel... is one of the few 
alternative transport fuels that we could 
roll out quickly using current infrastructure’ 
(BBSRC news, 2009). Expert advisors 
recommend R&D support for future ‘drop-
in’ biofuels which can directly substitute 
for petrol (ERP, 2011: 9; also AEA, 2011: 
8). Second, future biofuels will provide 
opportunities for UK competitive advantage 
in marketing its technoscientifi c skills and 
in licensing technology. Th ird, given EU 
targets for renewable energy in transport 
fuel, all member states must greatly expand 
biofuel use – preferably advanced biofuels 
by the 2020 deadline. 
Biomass conversion to liquid fuel 
is the least cost-eff ective way to save 
GHG emissions, as acknowledged by 
government. Nevertheless policy need not 
refl ect that hierarchy because ‘it does not 
take into account the relative importance of 
biomass fuel sources in delivering climate 
change goals and targets’, especially the EU 
target for renewable energy in transport fuel 
(DEFRA, 2007: 7). Th e policy pleaded a lack 
of alternatives to fulfi ll the 2020 target, while 
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also displacing sustainability problems onto 
future technological solutions: 
It is likely that by 2020 second-gener-
ation biofuel technologies will be in 
place. Th is should make the produc-
tion of biofuels from land much more 
effi  cient, with a reduced area needed 
to produce a given volume of biofuels… 
(DEFRA, 2007: 22).
In 2008 the government proposed a 5% target 
for biofuels by 2010, partly as an incentive 
for industry to develop second-generation 
biofuels. In response Parliament’s 
Environmental Audit Committee advocated 
a moratorium on biofuel targets, while also 
counterposing other measures to reduce 
GHG emissions from transport, e.g. a shift 
towards electric vehicles and/or public 
transport (EAC, 2008a). Th e Committee 
also warned about a technological lock-in of 
current biofuels: ‘support for fi rst generation 
biofuels might not have the desired eff ect’, 
i.e. generating viable second-generation 
biofuels (EAC, 2008c: 4). Th e Renewable 
Fuel Agency likewise criticised EU targets 
for transport fuels yet also anticipated 
sustainability improvements from second-
generation biofuels, which would help to 
alleviate the ‘food versus fuel’ confl ict (RFA, 
2008: 41). In response the government 
maintained its support for rising targets as a 
necessary transitional stage towards future 
biofuels (EAC, 2008b: 11). 
Th is priority resonated with the aim to 
export valuable knowledge. In its Renewable 
Energy Strategy, DECC emphasised export 
opportunities, especially for technological 
innovation in biofuels: UK producers ‘will 
have the opportunity to compete in a global 
market if they can meet the European 
mandatory standards’ (DECC, 2009a: 
111). From approximately 2009 onwards 
the government greatly expanded R&D 
expenditure for bioenergy, especially for 
2nd-generation biofuels, also known as 
advanced biofuels.   In the controversy over 
UK biofuel targets, including concern about 
locking in conventional biofuels, benefi cent 
expectations for next-generation biofuels 
played a performative role (Berti & Levidow, 
forthcoming). 
UK Research Councils have elaborated 
those expectations for future benefi ts. For 
second-generation biofuels, expectations 
involve specifi c models of environmental 
sustainability and economic advantage – 
somewhat overlapping: Technoscientifi c 
innovation will expand the availability 
of renewable resources and will more 
effi  ciently convert them into second-
generation biofuels, while also reducing 
GHG emissions by replacing fossil fuels. 
Renewable resources will be renewed on 
a much larger scale in a sustainable way – 
e.g. by cultivating plants on ‘marginal land’, 
needing fewer external inputs, converting 
non-edible biomass, etc. 
As regards economic benefi ts, conversion 
processes are needed to produce drop-
in biofuels, i.e. as exact substitutes for 
fossil fuels within current infrastructure 
(interview, DECC, 01.04.11; interview, 
BBSRC, 05.04.11; ERP, 2011: 6). For example, 
‘Liquid fuel has a remit through to 2050 
because people will still want to drive their 
own individual transport’ (interview, ETI, 
08.06.12). Moreover, some sectors need 
energy-intensive fuel: for aircraft and long 
haul road freight, there are not so many 
alternatives currently in prospect for major 
reduction in GHG emissions’ (ERP, 2011: 6); 
this clearly implies long-term dependence 
on liquid fuel, regardless of biohydrogen or 
electric vehicles. 
Earlier technological expectations have 
encountered diffi  culties and delays. As a 
high-profi le rationale for R&D expenditure 
on second-generation biofuels, these 
are essential for fulfi lling the 2020 target 
(DEFRA, 2007: 22 as above). By 2009, 
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however, such future fuels were being 
envisaged for some time after 2020 (DECC, 
2009a: 53). To fulfi l the UK’s 10% renewable 
contribution to transport fuel by 2020, 
none will come from advanced biofuels, as 
the government reported to the EU (HMG, 
2010: 14). 
Doubts have been raised about long-term 
sustainability, even of advanced biofuels. 
According to advice from a statutory 
committee, road transport should not be a 
long-term priority for biofuels: 
Given limits to the global supply of sus-
tainable bioenergy, it is important that 
this is used in an optimal fashion. In 
general, this implies use in applications 
where there are currently no feasible 
low-carbon alternatives to hydrocarbon 
input. 
Th erefore biofuels for road transport should 
be only a short-term step, argued the report 
(CCC, 2011b: 10). Even whenever second-
generation biofuels materialise, moreover, 
they may not overcome feedstock shortages; 
indeed, they could result in competition 
between sectors for feedstock, according to 
an expert report for DECC (AEA, 2011: viii).
Despite those doubts and practical diffi  -
culties, UK government R&D priorities still 
favour advanced biofuels as oil substitutes 
within current transport infrastructure, 
aiming to make it more environmentally 
sustainable.  Similar expectations continue 
to justify priorities for ‘drop-in fuels’, thus 
reinforcing the internal combustion engine. 
Gasifi cation 
Gasifi cation uses high temperatures to 
convert biomass into syngas, which can be 
further converted into various energy forms. 
From a long history, especially in converting 
coal to liquid fuel, gasifi cation has recently 
attracted greater interest as a more 
effi  cient fl exible means to convert various 
feedstocks, e.g. carbon-based waste such as 
paper, petroleum-based wastes like plastics, 
and organic materials such as food scraps 
(DECC et al., 2012b: 81). Such conversion 
could off er environmental advantages over 
waste incineration, as regards waste disposal 
and energy yield. Despite its importance, 
gasifi cation has been an erratic priority over 
the past decade. Gasifi cation has undergone 
technoscientifi c development abroad, but 
little in the UK (E4tech/NNFCC, 2009: 51-
52). 
In the late 1990s state support was 
directed at new technologies, especially 
gasifi cation and pyrolysis, with expectations 
for short-term commercial scale-up. In 
particular the ARBRE (Arable Biomass 
Renewable Energy) demonstration project 
was an integrated gasifi cation-combined 
cycle system to generate electricity from 
dedicated energy crops. It had two funding 
sources with contradictory aims: A 15-
year contract from the Dept of Trade & 
Industry (DTI), under the Non-Fossil Fuel 
Obligation (NFFO), was intended to support 
reliable, ready technologies. In parallel, 
EC funds aimed to support experimental 
technologies. (Piterou et al., 2008: 2050). 
Such scale-up eff orts were premature:  
Th e targeting of more advanced or novel 
technologies was even a greater failure 
as the most advanced technologies have 
failed to materialise. Th is focus on novel 
technologies has come at the expense 
of support to more mature technologies 
which would have helped the biomass 
energy sector to grow and expand (van 
der Horst, 2005: 712).
In those ways, high expectations 
mobilised resources but resulted in a 
multiple failure –  gaining little technical 
progress, undermining the credibility of 
large-scale gasifi cation and damaging the 
government’s reputation. By default, energy 
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supply companies had to import other 
conversion technologies which were ready 
for commercial use – the reverse of the 
original aim. Consequently, the government 
has been criticised for ‘picking losers’.  
More recently, future expectations 
for gasifi cation have been raised by 
government and expert reports. What role 
for UK investment and expertise? According 
to a 2009 expert report, gasifi cation will be 
developed fi rst abroad. So a key aim is to 
develop UK technoscientifi c skills which 
have broader relevance: ‘Th e gasifi cation 
and pyrolysis pilots would provide general 
project development related skills that might 
be applicable to biomass to liquids, and 
bring to bear UK strengths in engineering 
and petro-chemicals’ (E4tech/NNFCC, 
2009: 51-52).
Whenever gasifi cation becomes more 
fl exible, the technology is expected to 
provide input-substitutes for oil within 
current infrastructures. R&D priorities 
favour gasifi cation as a fl exible way to fuel 
current transport infrastructure; it can 
generate ‘drop in’ solutions particularly 
in the diffi  cult sectors of aviation and 
heavy goods vehicles. In both sectors, the 
Government has indicated biofuels should 
be prioritised because ‘no other solution 
is available’, according to the government-
funded National Non-Food Crops Centre 
(Tomkinson, 2012). 
Another foreseen application is waste-
recycling in ways localising energy 
production.  Gasifi cation is also promoted 
as a fl exible means for more effi  ciently 
converting diverse biomass inputs into 
various outputs. Th is role complements the 
well-known ‘waste hierarchy’ for optimising 
GHG reductions (DEFRA, 2011b).  
Gasifi cation is expected to facilitate a shift 
to non-food feedstocks for novel biofuels, as 
well as employment creation. According to 
an expert study by the National Non-Food 
Crops Centre: 
New technologies – like gasifi cation 
and pyrolysis – allow biofuels to be 
made from a wide range of sustainable 
materials, such as household rubbish… 
Under favourable economic conditions 
and strong improvements in policy sup-
port, projections suggest advanced bio-
fuels could meet up to 4.3 per cent of the 
UK’s renewable transport fuel target by 
2020…. At this scale advanced biofuels 
would save the UK 3.2 million tonnes 
of CO
2 
each year – equivalent to taking 
nearly a million cars off  the road – and 
create 6000 full-time construction jobs 
and over 2000 permanent jobs supply-
ing and operating the plants (Nattrass et 
al., 2011). 
Incorporating those expectations, the UK 
Bioenergy Strategy promoted gasifi cation 
as fl exible, especially for converting 
biowaste. Priorities will include R&D on 
yield improvements and technologies 
which can make better use of wastes. In 
particular, gasifi cation-derived bio-syngas 
is an intermediary for converting diverse 
bio-wastes into various energy forms and 
uses (DECC et al., 2012a: 55). 
To move forward gasifi cation, the Energy 
Technologies Institute allocated funds for a 
demonstrator project, linked with the 2050 
targets. Specifi cally, it announced 
… a new £13 million project to help 
design and build a next-generation 
energy from waste demonstrator plant 
to convert typical wastes into elec-
tricity and heat. Th e ETI is focused on 
the acceleration of the development 
of aff ordable, clean and secure tech-
nologies that will help the UK meet its 
legally binding 2050 climate change tar-
gets… (ETI, 2012).
Such expectations also include a link to 
CCS. According to an ETI staff  member: 
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gasifi cation ‘also enables carbon capture & 
storage, which is becoming a major topic 
across Europe as it delivers negative GHG 
emissions’ (interview, ETI, 08.06.12).  Th e 
priority for energy-from-waste anticipates 
that the UK could gain a competitive 
advantage in technology for this process. 
Gasifi cation is also expected to make 
biowaste-CHP more economically viable: 
‘Gasifi cation systems can also be used for 
small-scale heat and CHP applications, 
which are commercially deployed with 
support in some countries’ (LCICG, 2012: 
17). 
Biowaste is spatially distributed, thus 
off ering opportunities for decentralisation. 
Indeed, UK policy has advocated biowaste-
CHP as a means to decentralise production, 
while also enhancing use of waste heat, 
thus saving GHG emissions (DECC, 2009a: 
115). Nevertheless the prevalent design will 
provide input-substitutes for centralised 
infrastructure: ‘Gasifi cation plants will 
generally be in or near waste-handling 
facilities, which tend to be far away from 
potential heat users’ (interview, ETI, 
08.06.12). Th is design complements policy 
assumptions, e.g. about centralisation 
being more cost-eff ective and novel inputs 
remaining invisible to consumers. 
BE-CCS
Bioenergy-carbon capture and storage 
(BE-CCS) already had a central role in the 
UK’s 2011 Carbon Plan for fulfi lling 2050 
targets. Among three future scenarios, one 
expects to save even more GHG emissions 
through CCS by expanding bioenergy, thus 
compensating for greater imports of cheap 
natural gas (DECC, 2011: 17). Although BE-
CCS is foreseen as more speculative than 
other pathways, its technical success would 
signifi cantly lower the costs of UK carbon 
targets (DECC et al., 2012), according to 
widely shared expectations.
Moreover, the UK Bioenergy Strategy 
emphasised fl exible deployment for 
negative emissions: 
Bioenergy carbon capture and storage 
(BE-CCS) could produce bioenergy in 
the form of biopower, biohydrogen, bio-
heat and biofuels, but most signifi cantly 
permanently store underground the 
waste carbon from these processes that 
was taken from the atmosphere by plant 
growth, providing net carbon removal 
from the atmosphere or ‘negative emis-
sions’ (DECC et al., 2012a: 42). 
CCS would open up options for various 
sectors, including biohydrogen:
 the priority should be for continued use 
of biomass resource in process heat-
ing, and in the transport sector, either 
through bioenergy hydrogen produc-
tion with CCS or through biofuels for 
aviation and shipping if CCS is not 
available (DECC et al., 2012a: 41).
How would BE-CCS relate to current 
infrastructure? A localised small-scale 
design would facilitate biomass supply 
and enhance GHG savings, according to an 
academic study:
While biomass co-fi ring with coal off ers 
an early route to BE-CCS, a quite sub-
stantial (>20%) biomass component may 
be necessary to achieve negative emis-
sions in a co-fi red CCS system. Smaller-
scale BE-CCS, through co-location of 
dedicated or co-combusted biomass 
on fossil CCS CO
2
  transport pipeline 
routes, is easier to envisage and would 
be potentially less problematic (Upham 
& Gough, 2011).
Nevertheless the prevalent design assumes 
that BE-CCS will complement centralised 
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infrastructure for fossil fuels, as promoted by 
major energy companies within the Energy 
Technologies Institute (ETI). Bringing 
together several major energy companies 
for common projects, ETI ‘identifi ed a 
specifi c opportunity to develop capture 
technology for new-build, pre-combustion 
coal capture based on physical separation 
of CO
2
  from synthesis gas’, i.e. initially in 
coal plants. It invited company proposals 
‘for full-scale demonstration by 2015 and 
adoption into full scale commercial power 
applications by 2020’ (ETI, 2010). Biomass 
is foreseen as supplying a few large-scale 
centralised plants (interview, ETI, 08.06.12). 
Moreover, eventually the negative 
emissions are expected to lighten the 
burden of GHG savings from fossil fuels. 
Th ese emissions could then be used to 
off set fossil fuel emissions from other 
harder-to-decarbonise sectors (DECC et 
al., 2012a: 41). Put more explicitly: such 
negative carbon emissions could reduce 
the cost of low-carbon energy supply 
because we could go on using gas, possibly 
even using coal, and balance it out with 
CCS’ (interview, DECC, 14.08.12; cf. ETI 
comment at bioenergy workshop, 20.11.12). 
Th us optimistic expectations for BE-CCS 
complement longer-term dependence 
on fossil fuel within current centralised 
infrastructure, regardless of whether or 
when BE-CCS materialises.  
Conclusions 
Let us return to the main question posed 
earlier: How do expectations for future 
technology mobilise resources for some 
innovation trajectories rather than others? 
Th is paper has shown that UK bioenergy 
innovation has been locked into current 
energy infrastructure through technological 
expectations, especially the reciprocal 
requirements of state bodies and industry. 
Th e technological expectations literature 
generally analyses how innovators seek 
support for a specifi c technoscientifi c 
pathway by raising expectations, thus 
generating a promise-requirement cycle, 
with requirements to demonstrate technical 
progress and/or raise new expectations. 
By contrast, our case study has focused 
on technological expectations within a 
wider policy framework: For its renewable 
energy and GHG targets, UK bioenergy 
policy depends on future expectations for 
bioenergy innovation, though not on any 
specifi c pathway. Th e paper has analysed 
state-industry reciprocal dynamics: having 
raised innovators’ expectations, state bodies 
face requirements to make long-term 
commitments for support measures.  
By accommodating industry proposals, 
UK state bodies have promoted expectations 
that bioenergy innovation generally will 
help to fulfi l targets for GHG savings in 
environmentally sustainable ways, among 
other societal benefi ts. Th ese promises 
have been turned into requirements for 
industry to demonstrate technical progress, 
as well as for state bodies to make long-
term commitments for support measures. 
Within those reciprocal dynamics, tensions 
have arisen among diff erent policy aims, 
energy futures, innovation pathways and 
expectations for their benefi ts. 
In particular state bodies have undergone 
various tensions among aims: fi rst, how 
to incentivise industry and prioritise state 
R&D funds, while justifying these measures 
as necessary to fulfi l several policy aims, 
especially GHG savings; second, how to 
make long-term commitments as incentives 
for industry investment, while leaving 
open future options which may be more 
environmentally sustainable; third, how to 
prioritise and justify innovation pathways as 
a ‘low-carbon’ future, especially in relation 
to current high-carbon infrastructural 
patterns of energy production and use. 
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Th ose tensions have been contained 
through technological expectations for 
bioenergy innovation in general, while 
ostensibly keeping open future options for 
state support and commercial development. 
UK policy language disavows any role 
in ‘picking winners’, while attributing 
innovation choices instead to the market 
or technoscientifi c progress, as if they were 
external factors. Yet some potential futures 
have been favoured by new institutional 
arrangements, alongside policy documents 
drawing on expert reports. 
Such arrangements closely link state 
bodies with industry, together seeking 
to de-risk R&D investment. UK Research 
Councils have off ered a great infl uence 
over priorities to companies co-funding 
R&D. Company representatives mainly 
comprise the government’s Technology 
Strategy Board, in turn infl uencing R&D 
priorities. Large energy companies co-
fund near-market technological scale-up as 
means to minimise or share fi nancial risks 
in commercialising technoscientifc results. 
Although those arrangements disperse 
decision-making across various state 
bodies, consequent support measures 
have followed a common pattern: specifi c 
innovation pathways envisage bioenergy 
mainly as input-substitutes within 
dominant high-carbon centralised systems. 
State bodies have framed expectations 
for societal benefi ts according to those 
priorities. Although technical progress 
has encountered diffi  culties and long 
delays, expectations for economic benefi ts 
have helped to mobilise resources, while 
confl ating national benefi ts with private-
sector interests. Such expectations favour 
measures de-risking some potential 
innovations rather than others. 
From those expectations, CCS has gained 
support as a necessary means to turn high-
carbon systems into low-carbon ones. Even 
when more biomass substitutes for coal 
inputs via co-fi ring, however, bioenergy-
CCS will reinforce current infrastructure 
for electricity-only coal plants within 
centralised electricity systems. Moreover, 
‘carbon-negative’ CCS is expected to 
off set GHG emissions from fossil fuels, 
thus reinforcing and justifying long-term 
dependence on high-carbon energy 
sources. 
As regards the three longer-term ‘hedging 
options’ in the UK Bioenergy Strategy, 
expectations inform priorities as follows: 
1. Biohydrogen: For the past decade, 
government policy has promoted 
hydrogen fuel cells as the preferable 
alternative to the internal combustion 
engine. Th is alternative is foreseen 
as even more environmentally 
sustainable if using biomass inputs for 
biohydrogen. But this pathway would 
require new infrastructure and perhaps 
undermine the dominant one; it has 
gained relatively less fi nancial support 
for R&D. 
2. Advanced biofuels: Th ese have been 
strongly promoted for several aims – to 
build on UK technoscientifi c strengths, 
to gain intellectual property from those 
strengths, to avoid the ‘fuel versus 
food’ confl ict and to avoid a lock-in of 
conventional biofuels. Yet any biofuels, 
especially the search for ‘drop-in fuels’, 
reinforces the internal combustion 
engine and thus dependence on liquid 
fuels. 
3. Gasifi cation: Th is technology has been 
promoted for its economic benefi ts 
and fl exible links with several other 
pathways. In particular, biowaste-
to-energy conversion would turn an 
environmental burden into an asset. 
Yet gasifi cation readily complements 
centralised infrastructure and is being 
envisaged along such lines. 
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Although UK policy documents mention 
several desired futures, only some are 
wishfully enacted by mobilising resources. 
Th ese priorities complement broader policy 
assumptions as follows: Cost-eff ective, GHG 
reduction depends on inherent effi  ciencies 
of large-scale systems. National economic 
benefi ts arise from large companies selling 
novel technology or patents abroad, or with 
large-scale infrastructures maintaining 
or creating employment, or with research 
institutes competing against each other for 
foreign investment.  GHG savings should 
not depend on behavioural changes, so 
input-substitution remaining invisible to 
consumers will be politically more reliable. 
Th ese policy assumptions manifest a more 
general socio-technical lock-in of energy 
systems. 
Th us technological expectations 
complement a path-dependent reinforce-
ment of dominant infrastructures. Th is 
role has historical analogies with earlier 
technoscientifi c innovation. As Edgerton 
(2006: 210) put it:
Calling for innovation is, paradoxi-
cally, a common way of avoiding change 
when change is not wanted. Th e argu-
ment that future science and technol-
ogy will deal with global warming is an 
instance. It is implicitly arguing that, 
in today’s world, only what we have is 
possible.
By contrast to that foreclosure, government 
policy also has promoted expectations for 
bioenergy to decentralise energy systems 
along with community involvement. But 
such pathways have remained marginal in 
support measures. To realise those potential 
futures, state bodies would need stronger 
involvement of actors such as SMEs and 
local public-sector authorities. 
In conclusion, this paper has analysed 
reciprocal requirements of state bodies and 
industry within technological expectations, 
while linking these with path-dependence, 
thus enriching both analytical perspectives. 
Th rough UK state-industry arrangements, 
technological expectations mobilise 
fi nancial support for novel path creation 
within a fundamental path dependence. UK 
bioenergy strategy mentions eff orts to avoid 
lock-ins, yet only some are explicitly called 
lock-ins. A fundamental path dependence 
is implicitly accepted by default, or is even 
sought as benefi cial – as accommodating 
current energy infrastructures and 
consumption patterns.  
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